Loading...

"Demonstrated interest" as costly signaling in college admissions

Loading...
"Demonstrated interest" as costly signaling in college admissions - Hallo friend LATEST JOBS, In the article you read this time with the title "Demonstrated interest" as costly signaling in college admissions, we have prepared well for this article you read and download the information therein. hopefully fill posts Article bank, Article contracting, Article health, Article lecturer, Article manufacturing, Article marketing, Article property, Article public, Article teachers, Article telecommunications, we write this you can understand. Well, happy reading.

Title : "Demonstrated interest" as costly signaling in college admissions
link : "Demonstrated interest" as costly signaling in college admissions

Read also


"Demonstrated interest" as costly signaling in college admissions

Costly signals are valuable as signals because they are costly to send. But of course they may be more costly for some to send than others.


"Demonstrated interest: Signaling behavior in college admissions" (by James Deardon, Suhui Li, Chad Meyerhoefer, and Muzhe Yang) Contemporary Economic Policy (2017)

Abstract

In college admission decisions, important and possibly competing goals include increasing the quality of the freshman class and making the school more selective while attaining the targeted size of the incoming class. Especially for high-quality applicants who receive multiple competing offers, colleges are concerned about the probability that these students accept the offers of admission. As a result, applicants' contacts with admissions offices, such as campus visits, can be viewed positively by the officers as demonstrated interest in the colleges. We provide empirical evidence on the effects of demonstrated interest on admission outcomes. Specifically, we use unique and comprehensive administrative data, which include all contacts made by each applicant to the admissions office of a medium-sized highly selective university during two admission cycles. We find that an applicant who contacts the university is more likely to be admitted, and that the effect of the contact on the probability of admission is increasing in the applicant's Scholastic Assessment Test score, particularly when the contact is costly to make. We also use a numerical example to explore policies to reduce the inequity associated with the use of demonstrated interest in admission decisions, examining in particular the subsidization of costly demonstrated interest by low-income students.

Here's an article about the paper in Inside Higher Ed...
Another Edge for the Wealthy
"Many colleges favor applicants who show "demonstrated interest" -- and the way they measure it puts those without money at a disadvantage, study finds."


Thus Article "Demonstrated interest" as costly signaling in college admissions

that is all articles "Demonstrated interest" as costly signaling in college admissions This time, hopefully can provide benefits to all of you. Okay, see you in another article post.

You now read the article "Demonstrated interest" as costly signaling in college admissions with the link address https://latestjobsus.blogspot.com/2017/08/demonstrated-interest-as-costly.html

Subscribe to receive free email updates:

Related Posts :

0 Response to ""Demonstrated interest" as costly signaling in college admissions"

Post a Comment

Loading...